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Abstract
On Generative Adversarial Network Based Synthetic Iris Presentation Attack And Its
Detection
by
Naman Kohli

Human iris is considered a reliable and accurate modality for biometric recognition due
to its unique texture information. Reliability and accuracy of iris biometric modality have
prompted its large-scale deployment for critical applications such as border control and
national identification projects. The extensive growth of iris recognition systems has raised
apprehensions about the susceptibility of these systems to various presentation attacks.
In this thesis, a novel iris presentation attack using deep learning based synthetically
generated iris images is presented. Utilizing the generative capability of deep convolutional
generative adversarial networks and iris quality metrics, a new framework, named as iDCGAN is proposed for creating realistic appearing synthetic iris images. In-depth analysis
is performed using quality score distributions of real and synthetically generated iris images to understand the effectiveness of the proposed approach. We also demonstrate that
synthetically generated iris images can be used to attack existing iris recognition systems.
As synthetically generated iris images can be effectively deployed in iris presentation
attacks, it is important to develop accurate iris presentation attack detection algorithms
which can distinguish such synthetic iris images from real iris images. For this purpose,
a novel structural and textural feature-based iris presentation attack detection framework
(DESIST) is proposed. The key emphasis of DESIST is on developing a unified framework
for detecting a medley of iris presentation attacks, including synthetic iris. Experimental
evaluations showcase the efficacy of the proposed DESIST framework in detecting synthetic
iris presentation attacks.
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Chapter

Introduction
Traditional means of authentication require the use of passwords, identity cards or
simple metallic keys. However, these methods may not prevent an intruder from
obtaining unauthorized access and hence, circumventing the security of the system.
On the other hand, biometric systems rely on the intrinsic physical or behavioral
traits of an individual to establish their identity [13]. Biometric systems achieve this
goal by utilizing traits such as fingerprint, iris, face, ear, or voice.

Iris
Pupil
Pupillary Boundary
Sclera
Limbic Boundary

Figure 1.1: Anatomy of the human eye.
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Iris as a Biometric Modality

Iris is considered one of the most reliable and accurate biometric modalities due to the
highly unique character of iris tissue texture. Figure 1.1 shows the different parts of
the human eye along with the iris. The majority of iris recognition systems operate in
the near-infrared (NIR) spectrum (as opposed to the visible spectrum) because NIR
light does not excite the pupil which minimizes the pupil dilation and the texture of
dark-colored irides is better captured in the NIR spectrum [14].
A typical biometric system consists of the acquisition sensor, pre-processing unit,
feature extractor, database, and matcher modules [15]. For iris recognition, the image
acquisition module captures the iris image using a NIR sensor. The pre-processing
unit enhances the input iris image for segmenting the actual iris region. Next, the
normalization is performed which converts the segmented iris image into a normalized
iris image space. The feature extractor module extracts relevant iris features (such
as Hamming code) and encodes them as a template. The matcher module compares
the input/query iris features with the gallery templates to compute a match score.
Figure 1.2 shows the diagram of a typical iris recognition system.

Database

Feature
Extractor

Subject

Acquisition
Sensor

Matcher

Biometric Image
Final
Decision

Figure 1.2: Block diagram of a typical iris recognition system.
The first successful iris recognition algorithm was patented by John Daugman [16].
The key idea of Daugman’s algorithm was a test of statistical independence of the
phase of Gabor wavelets fitted on a grid of locations superimposed on a pseudo-polar
transformation of the iris texture. His algorithm has been the dominant and most
popular iris recognition method for years. It has been used successfully in numerous
applications such as border control, national ID projects such as Aadhar, and access
control.
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Feature
Extractor

6

Matcher

Yes/No

7
8

Stored
Template

Figure 1.3: Avenues for attack in a biometric pipeline [1].

1.2

Presentation Attacks in Biometrics

Even though biometric systems are being widely used worldwide, Ratha et. al. [1]
presented several avenues of attack on a biometric system and suggested different
steps to mitigate such attacks. Figure 1.3 showcases the vulnerable areas in the
traditional biometric pipeline. One potential points of attacks in a biometric system
is the transmission channel between the sensing device and the feature extraction
module [1]. A man-in-the-middle attack on this channel can be utilized to replace
the original image with a new synthetic image before the template extraction process.
More importantly, one of the avenue of attack is through presentation attacks at
sensor level which can be used both for identity impersonation and identity evasion.
The consequences of such an attack maybe wide-ranging as an individual may enroll
with different identities and avail facilities associated with the unique identity multiple
times.
Presentation attacks have been widely studied in the field of face and fingerprint
biometrics. With the increasing usage of face authentication systems, presentation
attacks are becoming a serious point of concern, particularly for unmanned applications such as ATM machines. As faces are easy to acquire without the subject’s
consent or awareness, impersonating someone’s identity is easy [17]. With faces, impostors can present to the acquisition sensor a photo or a digital video [18]. Similarly,
identity hiding is also less challenging with the usage of 3D hard masks [19] or more
sophisticated silicone masks [20]. With respect to fingerprints, the most common presentation attack consists of using artificial replicas [21] of valid subjects. This can be
achieved using a cooperative method or non-cooperative method. In the cooperative
method, the user provides an impression of their fingerprint to replicate their finger-
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Figure 1.4: Sample images from Synthetic Database [2].
print with various materials such as gelatin, latex or silicone. On the other hand, in
the non-cooperative method, a latent fingerprint may be enhanced to create a mold.
Presentation attacks on iris modality can be divided into two subsets: physical
attacks and synthetic attacks. Physical presentation attacks include textured contact
lenses [22, 23] and print attacks [24] and have been widely explored in the literature.
Synthetic iris presentation attacks are conducted by synthetically generating iris [2].
The idea of generating synthetic iris images was initially introduced by Cui et al. [25]
with the intention of increasing the number of available iris images for developing iris
recognition algorithms. Figure 1.4 shows sample synthetic iris images from Synthetic
DataBase (SDB) by Galbally et al. [2]. In the next section, we look at the problem
of synthetic generation of images in biometrics which can be used as a presentation
attack to spoof a biometric sensor.

1.3

Synthetic Image Generation in Biometrics

Earlier, the purpose of generating synthetic biometric samples was to supplement
the number of publicly available images. An advantage of this was circumventing
privacy concerns as these synthetic samples were not directly related to a particular
person. However, with the introduction of new deep learning based techniques such
as generative adversarial networks and their ability to create real looking synthetic
images, these images may be utilized as presentation attacks for various biometric
systems.
Cappelli et al. [26] introduced the problem of synthetically altered fingerprints
and they used the SFinGe framework for generating artificial fingerprints. With
respect to fingerprint presentation attacks, the idea of masterprint [27] was introduced
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which consisted of creating synthetic fingerprints which match with one or more of
the stored templates of various users in the database. Moreover, Ferrara et al. [3]
explored the possibility of creating a new fingerprint by combining features from two
different fingers. In this manner, the synthetic fingerprint has a high probability of
falsely matching with the fingerprints from the source prints. Fake/synthesized face
generation has received exceptional attention due to the advancement in generative
adversarial networks. These generative adversarial networks are based on competition
between two convolutional neural networks: discriminator and generator, to generate
realistic synthetic face images.
Similar to face and fingerprint biometric modalities, different researchers have
proposed various techniques to generate synthetic iris images. Shah and Ross [9]
employed Markov Random Field to generate initial texture of the iris images followed
by embedding iris features such as radial and concentric furrows to create the final
synthetic iris image. Zuo et al. [28] developed an anatomy-based model to create
new irises similar to real-world iris images. Galbally et al. [2] reconstructed synthetic
iris images from the feature template to successfully match the original genuine iris
image. However, it is seen that these images do not resemble real iris images and
appear fake.

1.4

Contributions of the Thesis

In this thesis, we propose a new iris presentation attack by synthesizing iris images
through a deep convolutional generative adversarial network. As described earlier,
recently, improvements in techniques such as generative adversarial networks and
variational autoencoders have provided a breakthrough in generating new images.
These approaches have paved the path for generating realistic looking synthetic images
for different applications. In this thesis, we have proposed a novel synthetic iris
image generation method using the generative adversarial network and demonstrated
that it can attack iris recognition systems. Additionally, a novel presentation attack
detection algorithm has been proposed to detect multiple iris presentation attacks
including synthetic iris presentation attack. The major contributions of this thesis
are:
• A novel domain-specific generative adversarial network (GAN) named as iDCGAN for generating synthetic iris images is proposed. We adapt deep convolutional generative adversarial network by utilizing iris quality assessment for
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synthesizing realistic looking iris images.
• Analysis is performed using quality score distributions of real and synthetically
generated iris images to understand the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
We also demonstrate that synthetically generated iris images can be used to
attack existing iris recognition systems.
• We propose a novel framework utilizing structural and textural features to detect multiple iris presentation attacks, including synthetic iris.
• Evaluation using the proposed iris presentation attack detection algorithm is
performed to ascertain its efficacy in distinguishing synthetically generated images from real images.

1.5

Organization of the Thesis

In the next chapter, the literature review of synthetic presentation attacks in biometrics and iris presentation attacks is presented. Chapter 3 describes the technique
for synthetic iris presentation attack using the proposed iDCGAN (iris Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Network). Chapter 4 presents a novel framework
utilizing structural and textural features to detect multiple iris presentation attacks,
including synthetic iris images. Finally, in Chapter 5, conclusion and future work of
this thesis are presented.

Chapter

Literature Review
Synthetic biometrics is defined as artificially generated biometric data, which exhibits
meaningful biological characteristics and thus, can fool existing biometric sensors.
The advancement in generative modeling algorithms has led to a variety of frameworks
in generating synthetic images in the field of biometrics. The subsequent sections in
this chapter focus on the literature of generating synthetic biometric images and
presentation attacks in iris recognition.

2.1

Synthetic Presentation Attack in Biometrics

Previously, the focus of generating these synthetic biometric images was for increasing
the count of images alongside publicly available databases. These synthetic images
also helped in reducing privacy constraints as they were not directly linked to any
physical identity. However, with the generation of realistic looking images, the focus
has shifted to the usage of these images for presentation attack. The synthesis process
of generation has been seen across all three biometric modalities: fingerprint, face,
and iris.
The problem of synthetically altered fingerprints was introduced by Cappelli et
al. [26] and they proposed the SFinGe framework for generating artificial fingerprints.
Since then, different approaches have been introduced to generate synthetic fingerprints. Zhao et al. [29] utilized statistical models to generate realistic fingerprint
images. Johnson et al. [30] used texture characterizing features such as ridge intensity along the ridge center-lines with seven frequency components, ridge width, ridge
cross-sectional slope, ridge noise, and valley noise for creating new fingerprint images.
With respect to presentation attack, the concept of master print [27] has been intro7
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 2.1: Sample images depicting different types of synthetic fingerprints: (a)
LivDet 2013, (b) CASIA DB and (c) Joint fingerprint created from two fingerprints
[3]
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duced which consist of creating a synthetic fingerprint that matches one or more of
the stored templates for a significant number of users. Ferrara et al. [3] have also
explored the feasibility of creating a fingerprint combining features from two different fingers so that it has a high chance to be falsely matched with fingerprints from
both fingers and reported successful results. Figure 2.1 showcases different types of
synthetic fingerprints produced in the literature.
Different approaches have been proposed to simulate aging in faces [31, 32]. However, synthesis of faces has received tremendous amount of interest due to advancement in generative adversarial networks. Generative adversarial networks rely on
competition between two networks - discriminator and generator to generate realistic
images. The goal of the discriminator network is to identify whether an input face
image is real or fake while the goal of the generator network is to generate realistic
looking images that should be able to fool the discriminator.
Radford et al. [4] presented a deep convolutional neural network in a generative adversarial network framework. They removed max-pooling layers and showed realistic
looking images for different databases including faces. Berthelot et al. [6] proposed
an equilibrium enforcing method paired with a Wasserstein loss distance function.

DCGAN

BEGAN

STAR-GAN

Progressive growing of GANs

Figure 2.2: Sample images depicting synthetic faces generated from different types of
generative adversarial networks. Image source: [4], [5], [6], and [7].
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(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 2.3: Sample images depicting synthetic irises: (a) Lefohn et al. [8], (b) Shah
and Ross [9] , (c) Cardoso et al. [10], and (d) Wei et al. [11] .
Choi et al. [5] introduced STAR-GAN, a scalable image-to-image translation model
among multiple domains using a single generator and a discriminator. Finally, Karras
et al. [7], showcased a new methodology for training generative adversarial networks
by progressively growing both the generator and discriminator networks. Figure 2.2
displays the synthetic faces generated by these network models.
Similar to the other face and fingerprint biometric modalities, several authors have
proposed new techniques to generate synthetic iris images. Lefohn et al. [8] proposed
a method to create a fake eyeball that matches the texture of a real human iris.
Other researchers [9, 28] have proposed texture based and model-based methods to
generate iris patterns followed by artificially adding other eye regions. More recently,
Cardoso et al. [10] described a stochastic method to synthesize ocular data. Figure
2.3 showcases examples of synthetic iris images found in the literature.
Particularly, the idea of generating synthetic iris images was initially introduced by
Cui et al. [25] with the intention of increasing the number of available iris images for
developing iris recognition algorithms. They employed principal component analysis
and super-resolution techniques to create new images for iris synthesis. Shah and
Ross [9] generated the initial texture of the iris images by utilizing Markov Random
Field. Other iris features such as radial and concentric furrows were embedded to
create the final synthetic iris image. Zuo et al. [28] developed an anatomy-based
model for generation of realistic iris images. Galbally et al. [2] used the feature
template to reconstruct synthetic iris images where the main goal was to match the
generated iris image to the original genuine iris image.

2.2

Iris Presentation Attack

The success of large-scale iris recognition based identity application has increased its
susceptibility to individuals who, by means of presentation attack or spoofing, can
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)
Figure 2.4: Sample images depicting different types of presentation attacks: (a) textured contact lens, (b) synthetic iris, and (c) and (d) print attack
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gain unauthorized access to locations or escape recognition as a person of interest.
Detecting such presentation/spoofing attacks has become a key objective in designing
such systems and is the topic of ongoing standards efforts, e.g. ISO/IEC 301071:2016. Presentation attacks in iris modality can be divided into physical attacks and
synthetic attacks. Some typical iris presentation attack methods are illustrated in
Figure 2.4 and briefly described herewith:
• Printed Iris Images: This physical attack is easiest to instigate as it involves
presenting an image of a real iris to the sensor. The image could be a scanned or
printed copy of the original iris/eye image that can be used with the intention
of impersonating another person’s identity. Using a good quality paper, printer
and high-resolution iris images, spoofed iris images can be generated to exploit
recognition systems [33]. The study by Gupta et al. [24] had shown that both
print+scan and print+capture attacks can reduce the verification accuracy to
less than 10% at 0.01% false accept rate (FAR).
• Textured Contact Lenses: With the advances in technology and low costs, contact lenses are gaining popularity around the world. Apart from being used for
eyesight correction, they are increasingly being used for cosmetic purposes as
well. These textured (cosmetic) lenses cover the original texture of the iris with
a thin textured lens which can severely degrade the performance of iris recognition systems. Several studies [34, 22, 23, 35] have demonstrated the need
for detecting contact lenses as both transparent (soft) and textured (cosmetic)
lenses have been shown to affect iris recognition systems.
• Synthetic Iris Images: Venugopalan and Savvides [36] described a novel presentation attack by creating synthetic “natural” iris images that can fool iris
recognition systems. They embedded features in the iris to spoof another person’s iris and assumed that the feature extraction mechanism of the iris system
is known. Galbally et al. [37] proposed a genetic algorithm based synthetic
iris creation technique. Their probabilistic approach generated iris-like pattern
whose corresponding iriscode matched with a genuine user. Table 2.1 summarizes publicly available iris databases that consist of synthetic iris images.

Naman Kohli

13

2.3. Iris Presentation Attack Detection

Table 2.1: Databases for synthetic iris images.
Database
Synthetic Iris Texture Based [9]
Synthetic Iris Model Based [28]
CASIA-Iris-Syn-V4 [11]
CASIA-Iris-Fake [38]
IIITD Combined Spoofing Database [39]

2.3

Unique Iris
Real fake
0
1000
0
10000
0
1000
1000 815
1744 2000

Num
Real
0
0
0
6000
9325

Samples
fake
7000
160000
10000
4120
11368

Iris Presentation Attack Detection

Several studies in the literature have been published to detect these presentation
attack in iris images as shown in Table 2.2. In their paper, Sun et al. [38] developed a
new synthetic database, CASIA-Iris-Fake, and demonstrated the performance of their
algorithm, Hierarchical Visual Codebook (HVC) which is based on textural analysis.
The HVC method utilizes a mixture of two Bag-of-Words models, Vocabulary Tree
and Locality-constrained Linear Encoding. They showcased the performance of their
algorithm on iris liveness detection as well as race classification.
Akhtar et al. [12] proposed LUCID descriptor and evaluated its efficacy on ATVSFIr database of printed iris images. Gragnaniello et al. [40] investigated different local
descriptors such as LBP, BSIF, LPQ, DAISY etc for their effectiveness in capturing
the differences between real and fake biometric samples. They concluded that local
descriptors work surprisingly well in such tasks.
Silva et al. [41] introduced a three layer convolutional neural network to detect
images with textured contact lens. They showcased an improvement of 30% over the
state-of-the-art algorithm on two iris databases. Komogortsev et al. [42] perform iris
liveness detection at the feature and match score levels for several existing forms of
eye movement biometrics such as fixations and saccades. Their results concluded that
eye movement biometrics are highly resistant to circumvention.
Menotti et al. [43] focus on designing optimal deep neural networks by optimizing
search space in figuring out the topology and optimizing filters for detecting presentation attacks. They showcase improvement in results across all three biometric
modalities: face, fingerprint and iris. Doyle and Bowyer [44] proposed BSIF features
for detection of textured contact lenses in iris images. Raghavendra and Busch [45]
proposed a multi-scale binarized statistical image feature (m-BSIF) on iris and periocular images along with linear support vector machines to detect image print attack
and screen attack.
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Table 2.2: Selected software-based iris presentation attack detection algorithms proposed in the literature since 2014.
Year

Authors

Algorithm

2014

Sun et al. [38]

Hierarchical visual codebook

2014

Akhtar et al.
[12]

LUCID

2015

Gragnaniello et
al. [40]

2015

Silva et al. [41]

2015
2015

Komogortsev et
al. [42]
Menotti et al.
[43]

2015

Doyle and
Bowyer [44]

2015

Raghavendra
and Busch [45]

2016

Raja et. al [49]

Combination of local descriptors
Convolutional neural network
based representation learning
Feature-level and score-level
liveness detection
Deep learning and filter
optimization based framework
Local texture descriptors
Multiscale Binarized Statistical
Features
Adaptive texture patterns
computed by local microfeatures
and globalspatial features
Regional feature computation
via spatial pyramid and
relational measure features

2016

Hu et al. [46]

2018

Yadav et al. [47]

Alexnet based deep features

2019

Kuehlkamp et
al. [48]

Ensemble of multi-view learners

Attack
Print, Lens,
Synthetic
Print
Textured
contact lens,
print
Textured
contact lens
Replay
Print
Textured and
transparent
contact lens
Textured
contact lens
Print
Textured
contact lens,
Print
Textured
contact lens
Textured
contact lens,
Print

Hu et al. [46] utilized spatial pyramid based features and feature level convolutional operators for relational measures to detect iris presentation attacks. Yadav et
al. [47] introduced a large textured contact lens iris database in unconstrained environment and showcased the effectiveness of deep learning features in detecting such
presentation attacks. Kuehlkamp et al. [48] combined lightweight CNNs to classify
multiple views of BSIF features in order to categorize presented iris image as real or
spoofed.
However, most of the algorithms, focus on detecting a single type of iris presen-
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tation attack. Thus, it is important to design an algorithm that can detect multiple
types of iris presentation attacks which depicts a realistic scenario. In the next chapter, we present a novel way to generate synthetic iris images and compare them with
real iris images with respect to iris quality measures. Subsequently, we showcase a
novel iris presentation attack detection algorithm that can detect multiple types of
iris presentation attacks.

Chapter

Synthetic Presentation Attack using
Generative Adversarial Networks
The advent of deep learning algorithms has led to state-of-the-art results in discriminative tasks in various research areas such as image classification, face verification,
and speech recognition. On the other hand, deep generative models have had limited
success due to intractable probabilistic computations arising in maximum likelihood
estimation. However, improvements in techniques such as generative adversarial net-

Figure 3.1: A mixture of real and synthetic iris images generated from the proposed
iDCGAN framework are shown above. We encourage the readers to identify which of
these iris images are real and synthetic. The solution is shown in Figure 3.10 at the
end of this chapter.
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works [50] and variational autoencoders [51] have provided a breakthrough in generative modeling.
Generative adversarial networks have paved the path for generating realistic looking synthetic images for different applications. In this thesis, a new iris presentation
attack is proposed by synthesizing iris images through a deep convolutional generative adversarial network. It is also demonstrated that these novel iris images can be
utilized to attack iris recognition systems. The major contributions of the chapter
are:
1. A novel domain-specific generative adversarial network (GAN) named as iDCGAN for generating synthetic iris images is proposed. We adapt deep convolutional generative adversarial network by utilizing iris quality assessment for
synthesizing realistic looking iris images.
2. Analysis is performed using quality score distributions of real and synthetically
generated iris images to understand the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
3. We also demonstrate that synthetically generated iris images can be used to
attack existing iris recognition systems. A merit of the proposed framework as
compared to Galbally et al. [2] is that there is no requirement of binary feature
templates for creating the synthetic iris images using the proposed framework.

3.1

Synthetic Iris Image Generation Framework

In this thesis, we adapt the generative adversarial network for synthesizing realistic iris images to propose iris Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Network
(iDCGAN). Figure 3.2 shows the steps involved in the proposed approach.

3.1.1

Generative Adversarial Network

Goodfellow et al. [50] introduced the concept of generative adversarial networks
(GANs) where the generative model is pitted against an adversarial discriminator
to generate representations which cannot be differentiated by the discriminator. The
aim of the generator is to learn the probability distribution of the input data perfectly
enough to fool the discriminator.
Let x be the input data which has a true probability distribution p(x). Let G
be the generative network which takes an input latent vector z, drawn from a noisy
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Discriminator
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Generator
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Real Iris Training Images

Generated Images
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Figure 3.2: Illustrating the proposed iDCGAN framework for generating synthetic
iris images.
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probability distribution pnoise (z) and outputs a new image x̄. Then, the discriminator
network D has to discern if the input image, randomly chosen from x or x̄, is generated
from the true probability distribution p(x) or not. The two models are trained using
a minimax objective and the loss function L is shown in Eq. 3.1.
L = min max Ex∼p(x) [log(D(x))]
G

D

+ Ez∼pnoise (z) [log(1 − D(G(z))]

(3.1)

A number of variants of GANs have been introduced such as conditional GANs
[52], Laplacian GANs [53], and InfoGANs [54]. These variants have been successfully utilized in image inpainting [55], style transfer [56], and super-resolution [57]
applications. Shrivastava et al. also proposed SimGAN [58] which uses a refiner
network to improve appearance of synthetically generated eye images to make them
indistinguishable from real eye images.

3.1.2

Proposed iDCGAN for Iris Image Synthesis

Radford et al. [59] introduced deep convolutional generative adversarial networks
(DCGAN) for unsupervised learning of features by utilizing convolutional neural networks as the generator and discriminator network. They also applied constraints on
architectural topology of convolutional neural networks in the generator and discriminator networks for stable training. Specifically, pooling functions were replaced with
strided convolutions which allowed the resultant network to learn its own spatial upsampling. Additionally, the fully connected layers at the top of convolutional neural
networks were removed and batch normalization was utilized for improving model
stability by normalizing each unit to have zero mean and unit variance.
In this thesis, we propose an extension to DCGAN by utilizing domain (iris)
specific knowledge. The new generative adversarial network is termed as iDCGAN
(iris Deep Convolutional Generative Adversarial Network). Similar to the idea of
conditional GANs [52], it uses auxiliary information of iris quality to improve the
performance of both discriminator and generator deep convolutional networks.
In an iris recognition system, iris image quality assessment is an integral step as
the quality of iris images can greatly impact the performance of iris recognition. It has
been ascertained that different artifacts such as occlusion, off-gaze direction, motion
blurriness, and specular reflection can affect iris recognition performance [60, 61].
Thus, incorporating quality metrics in generative adversarial network can improve
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Figure 3.3: Sample synthetic iris images generated from the proposed iDCGAN framework.
the synthesis process. Eq. 3.2 shows the objective function of the proposed iDCGAN
framework.
L = min max Ex∼p(x) [log(D(⟨x, Q(x)⟩))]
G

D

+ Ez∼pnoise (z) [log(1 − D(⟨G(z), Q(G(z))⟩))]

(3.2)

where, Q(x) is a quality evaluating function that takes an input iris image and assigns a corresponding quality score. Thus, in the proposed iDCGAN framework the
generator network G, spawns new images of iris conditioned on high quality scores.
The input latent vector is generated from a noisy distribution p(z). This is provided as input to the generator network, where the generator generates iris images
according to the learned representations. Quality assessment of the iris images created by the generator G is performed. The quality of the iris images in the first
quartile is removed from the set to be passed to the discriminator network D. Similar
to the above step, the real iris image input to the discriminator network D is filtered
such that the training set contains iris images whose quality scores are above the first
quartile. The new samples are continuously generated to train the proposed iDCGAN
generator and discriminator. Figure 3.3 showcases sample iris images generated from
the proposed iDCGAN framework.
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Implementation Details

Three existing real iris image databases are utilized and combined together to form
the training set for the proposed iDCGAN framework:
IIITD Contact Lens Database [23] This database consists of iris images of 101
subjects. The database includes iris images of subjects with and without contact
lens. For training the proposed iDCGAN, only the real images (without contact
lens) belonging to these subjects are chosen.
IIT Delhi Iris Database [62] This database consists of real iris images pertaining
to 224 subjects.
MultiSensor Iris Database [39] Iris images of 547 subjects collected in multiple
sessions are utilized for training the proposed iDCGAN framework.
The input iris images are segmented so that only the iris and pupil regions are
considered as input to the iDCGAN framework. The framework is implemented in
Python language utilizing the TensorFlow library1 . Both the generator and discriminator networks are deep convolutional neural networks. The discriminator network
consists of four convolutional layers with a kernel size of 5 × 5 and strides of 2,
batch normalization and leaky rectified units. The generator network consists of four
strided transposed convolutional layers with a kernel size of 5 × 5 and strides of 2,
batch normalization and rectified units. The size of the final synthetic iris images is
128 × 128. A learning rate of 0.0002 and Adam optimizer are utilized to train the
proposed iDCGAN.

3.2

Analysis of Synthetically Generated Iris Images

The synthetic iris images produced by the proposed iDCGAN framework are evaluated
with respect to their similarity with real iris images. For this purpose, different
quality score metrics are computed for both real and generated iris images. The
quality metrics can evaluate factors such as sharpness of generated images, shape and
concentricity of pupil and iris etc.
1

https://www.tensorflow.org
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Experimental Protocol

The objective of this experiment is to determine the quality of the synthetically generated iris images and compare the quality score distribution with real iris images.
Using the combined training set described above, 8,905 real iris images are selected.
This is followed by generating an equal number of synthetic iris images using the
proposed iDCGAN framework. Bharadwaj et al. [63] described that the quality of
iris images can be categorized into image-based and biometric modality based quality measures. Using VeriEye, several image specific and biometric modality specific
quality scores are computed. These quality score metrics are described in ISO/IEC
29794-6 standards [64]. The following quality score metrics are employed for analysis
purposes:
• Pupil boundary circularity: This parameter represents the circularity of the
iris-pupil boundary. It is calculated as
(

2∗

√

)

π × pupil area / (pupil perimeter)

• Pupil contrast: The contrast value at the boundary of iris and pupil is an important parameter for successful iris segmentation. It is computed as the mean
of differences in grayscale values at left and right end of iris-pupil boundary.
• Pupil-iris ratio: This quality measure signifies the amount of dilation or constriction in the pupil.
• Pupil concentricity: This parameter measures the corresponding concentricity
between the iris and the pupil. It is calculated as follows where X and Y
represent the coordinates of the iris and pupil.
√

(Xpupil − Xiris )2 + (Ypupil − Yiris )2 /IrisRadius

• Sharpness: The sharpness of the image parameter is examined to understand
the magnitude of defocus in the input iris image. This is calculated using
Daugman’s focus score [65].
• Overall quality: The overall quality score of the iris image represents the comprehensive biometric quality of the presented iris sample. We have utilized
output quality score generated from VeriEye.
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Figure 3.4: Sharpness Metric for Real Iris vs generated Synthetic Iris

3.2.2

Results and Analysis

Figure 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 showcases the distributions of the above mentioned quality parameters pertaining to real iris images and synthetically generated
iris images. We observe that the quality measurements of the synthetically generated
images follow similar trends to the real iris images. The analysis of the quality metrics
can be categorized as follows:
Image based Quality: The sharpness score is an image based quality metric. It
is observed from Fig 3.4 that there is a significant overlap between the histograms of
sharpness observed in real iris images and synthetically generated iris images. The
χ2 distance between the sharpness quality histograms is 1.07 which is relatively low2 .
Similarly, pupil contrast parameter represents contrast difference in a specific region
of interest in the image. The χ2 distance between the pupil contrast histogram is 4.02.
It can be observed that the pupil contrast of synthetically generated images is skewed
on the higher side as compared to the pupil contrast of real iris images. Thus, larger
number of synthetically generated iris images using the proposed iDCGAN framework
have higher pupil contrast score as compared to real iris images.
Biometric based Quality: The pupil-iris ratio, pupil boundary circularity, and
2

Lower χ2 distance values signify very close match.
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Figure 3.5: Pupil Contrast Metric for Real Iris vs generated Synthetic Iris

Figure 3.6: Pupil Boundary Circularity Metric for Real Iris vs generated Synthetic
Iris
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Figure 3.7: Pupil Iris Ratio Metric for Real Iris vs generated Synthetic Iris

Figure 3.8: Pupil Concentricity Metric for Real Iris vs generated Synthetic Iris
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Figure 3.9: Overall Quality Metric for Real Iris vs generated Synthetic Iris
pupil concentricity are measures of the iris biometric modality. We observe that there
is a significant overlap between the distribution of pupil-iris ratio, pupil concentricity
and pupil boundary which is also confirmed by the χ2 distance of 1.07, 0.04 and 0.34,
respectively.
Overall Quality: The quality of the synthetically generated iris images is skewed
on the higher side and is different from the quality of the real iris images in the
combined training set. The generator network in the proposed iDCGAN framework is
trained to discard iris images that are not of good quality. Therefore, it has generated
high quality synthetic images.
The comparative analysis of these quality score metrics indicates that the synthetically generated iris images very closely resemble the real iris images.

3.3

Synthetic Iris as Presentation Attack

The objective of the proposed iDCGAN framework is to generate iris images which
appear real. Due to the realistic appearance of these synthetic iris images, they can be
used as an attack on any iris recognition system. In this experiment, we utilize VeriEye
[66] to examine if a commercial iris recognition matches these synthetic images to real
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iris images. The results of this experiment are utilized to establish that the output
images from the proposed iDCGAN framework can act as an iris presentation attack.

3.3.1

Experimental Setup

The goal of this experiment is to compute iris recognition scores between gallery and
probe sets to evaluate the impact of synthetically generated iris as presentation attacks. For this iris recognition experiment, real genuine, real impostor, and synthetic
impostor pairs are created using 8,905 real iris images and 8,905 synthetic iris images.
The match scores obtained by matching these pairs are analyzed and the results are
presented below.

3.3.2

Results and Analysis

These real genuine and synthetic impostor scores are analyzed to observe the impact of
synthetically generated iris images on the performance of VeriEye. Upon minimizing
the synthetic iris false accept to 0%, we observe that 15.2% of real iris genuine scores
are misclassified as impostors. On the other hand, minimizing the real iris false
reject to 0% leads to synthetic false accept rate of 67.66%. This showcases that the

Figure 3.10: Marked real iris and synthetically generated iris images using the proposed iDCGAN framework. Iris images inside the red border are real iris images and
the remaining iris images inside the green border are synthetically generated images.
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synthetically generated images adversely affect iris recognition and can pass through
the recognition system based on the chosen permissible error threshold.
Interestingly, we observe that all the synthetically generated iris images are encoded by VeriEye and templates are created for every image. A denial of service
attack can easily be executed on an iris recognition system by sending such synthetically generated iris images as input. These results validate that the realistic-looking
synthetically-generated iris outputs from the proposed iDCGAN framework can be potentially used for iris presentation attack. Figure 3.10 showcases the visual similarity
between real iris and synthetically generated iris images.

3.4

Summary

In this chapter, iDCGAN framework is proposed which incorporates iris domainspecific knowledge in the form of quality metric to generate high-quality iris images.
It is observed that the distributions of quality parameters described for a biometric
sample for the synthetically generated iris images are similar to that of real iris images,
thus, establishing the similarity between real and synthetically generated images. We
also demonstrate the probability of a successful presentation attack by utilizing these
synthetically generated iris images. This thesis highlights the need to develop accurate
iris presentation attack detection algorithms that can adapt to newer types of attacks
such as synthetic iris image attacks.

Chapter

Detection of Iris Presentation Attacks
using DESIST
In the literature, researchers have focused on one particular type of iris presentation
attack and have developed different algorithms to address it [67, 43, 41]. However,
in real-world scenarios, iris recognition systems should be able to handle and detect
all types of presentation attacks. The key motivation of this chapter is to simulate
this real-world iris presentation attack scenario for which, we assess print attacks,
synthetic iris images, and contact lenses comprehensively. Additionally, as shown in
Chapter 3, synthetically generated iris images can be used to attack iris recognition
systems and thus, need to be detected successfully.
The major contributions of this chapter are:
• Combining different types of iris presentation attacks in an attempt to simulate
real world scenarios,
• Proposing a novel framework utilizing structural and textural features to detect
such multiple complex presentation attacks, and
• Evaluating the proposed framework on synthetically generated iris images.
In the subsequent sections, we explain the proposed framework followed by the
databases used in this chapter, experimental protocol, and the results obtained.
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Proposed Detection Framework for Iris
Presentation Attack

Figure 4.1 shows the proposed DEtection of iriS spoofIng using Structural and
Textural feature (DESIST) framework for detecting spoofed iris images. The proposed framework involves two components: structural decomposition of images to
analyze local regions of the images and a textural analysis to observe the changes in
contrast to the input iris image. We describe both the parts in detail below.

4.1.1 Structural Decomposition of Images using Zernike
Moments
Zernike moments (ZMs) are known for their invariance across scale, rotation, and
translation; and have been successfully applied in iris segmentation [68] and iris recognition at a distance [69]. The motivation behind extracting these Zernike moments is
to capture the changes in the shape between a spoofed and a normal iris image. ZMs
of an image are defined over an orthogonal set of polynomials and involve computation of the radial polynomial Rn,m . Zernike basis functions can be calculated after the
polynomial is computed and projection of the input image over these basis functions
is determined. The radial polynomial R is defined as:
n−|m|
2

Rnm (ρ) =

∑
i=0

i!

(

(−1)i ρn−2i (n − i)!
n+|m|
2

) (

−i !

n−|m|
2

)

−i !

(4.1)

where, ρ is the distance between the center of the image and a corresponding point
(x, y) on the image, n is called the order of the polynomial and m are the repetitions
such that | m | < n and | n − m | is even. Zernike basis function can be directly
computed in the Cartesian coordinate space as defined below:
Zn,m (x, y) = Rnm (ρx,y )e−jmθx,y

(4.2)

where N × N is the size of the image,

ρx,y =
and

√
1
× (2x − N + 1)2 + (N − 1 − 2y)2
N

(4.3)
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Figure 4.1: Proposed structural and textural feature based iris presentation attack
detection (DESIST) framework for detecting spoofed iris images.
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)

N − 1 − 2y
θx,y = tan
(4.4)
2x − N + 1
Given an iris image I, dense Zernike moments are calculated for a given pair of
(n, m) across non-overlapping windows of size P × P . Multiple pairs of (n, m) are
selected to compute the amplitude of multi-order Zernike moments. This will help in
enhancing the representation of the input iris image.
−1

4.1.2 Textural Analysis using LBPV Descriptor
Through earlier studies [24, 23], it is known that spoofed iris attacks such as contact
lens iris images, printed iris images have variations in texture with respect to the
regular iris images. Therefore, the motivation behind utilizing texture techniques is to
identify the changed texture of the spoofed iris image. For this purpose, Local Binary
Pattern Variance (LBPV) descriptor [70] is utilized. LBPV descriptor accounts for
the contrast in the input images by adaptively weighing the LBP vectors by their
variance of the region. It is also more robust to illumination variation which is useful
as the acquired iris images may have different illumination sources. Thus, LBPV
descriptor is calculated for the input iris image and provided to the classifier.

4.1.3

Feature Fusion and Classification

Multi-order Zernike and LBPV features provide complementary information regarding the input iris image. Therefore, feature-level fusion is performed by concatenating
them. The concatenated (fused) feature vector is then used as input for an artificial
neural network (ANN) to determine whether the iris is spoofed or not. A three-layer
ANN is trained with H hidden nodes and scaled conjugate gradient algorithm is
utilized for back-propagation.

4.2

Experimental Results

4.2.1 Combined Spoofing Database
Different types of iris presentation attack databases are available in the research
community. We collected images from multiple publicly available iris presentation
attack databases and formed a combined spoofing database (CSD)1 . In this chapter,
1

The database can be downloaded from: http://iab-rubric.org/resources.html
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Table 4.1: Details of Combined Spoofing Database (CSD) and its constituents utilized
in this study.
Database

No. of
Subjects

IIIT-Delhi
CLI [23]

101

IIITD IIS
[24]

101

SDB [37]

1000

IIT Delhi
Iris [71]
MID
CSD

Type of Iris Images
Normal, Soft Contact
Lens, Textured
Contact Lens
Print+Scan and
Print+Capture of
IIIT-Delhi CLI
Synthetically
Generated

No. of
Spoofed
Samples

No. of
Normal
Samples

4420

1063

4848

0

2100

0

224

Normal

0

2240

547

Normal
All Combined and
Normal

0

6022

11368

9325

1872

the following databases are utilized to simulate the real-world scenario of a variety of
iris presentation attacks for iris recognition systems:
• IIIT-Delhi Contact Lens Iris (CLI) Database [23]: It contains images pertaining
to 101 subjects. For each subject, images are captured without lens, with
transparent (soft) lens, and with cosmetic lens (textured) using two different
iris sensors.
• IIITD Iris Spoofing (IIS) Database [24]: IIIT-Delhi CLI database is utilized to
create the IIS database. Cogent CIS 202 dual eye iris scanner and HP flatbed optical scanner are used to create print attack scenarios. In the print+capture attack, input to iris scanners are the printed iris images whereas in the print+scan
attack, printed iris images are scanned using a flatbed scanner.
• Synthetic Database (SDB) [37]: The database by Galbally et al. is generated
using Markov Random Field and various iris features to create images of 1000
subjects.
• IIT Delhi Iris Database [71]: This database contains normal (non-spoofed) iris
images of 224 subjects. The database has been included in the study to represent
the normal class.
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• Multi-sensor Iris Database (MID): In order to build representations of the normal class, iris images of 547 subjects are collected and included in the combined
database.
Table 4.1 summarizes the characteristics of combined spoofing database (CSD) and
its constituent databases used in this study.

4.2.2 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of the proposed DESIST framework, images from the
combined spoofing database (CSD) are resized to a common size of 256 × 256 pixels.
Following the protocol described in [23], two folds are created for each database where
50% of the subjects are assigned to fold one and the remaining 50% of the subjects
are assigned to the other fold. Using these unseen training and testing folds, five
times random two fold cross-validation is performed.
Multi-order local Zernike moments are computed from non-overlapping windows
of size P × P of the images. The amplitude of the Zernike moments is computed for
order of the Zernike moments (n) = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) and corresponding
repetition number of Zernike moment (m) = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0). LBPV
features are also computed for the whole iris image and feature-level fusion is performed using the Zernike and LBVP features. These features are used for the final
classification of the input image as spoofed or normal. A three layer neural network
is trained using fused features for two-class classification. Along with the proposed
algorithm, we have evaluated the performance of several existing descriptors as well.

4.2.3 Results and Analysis
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves shown in Figure 4.2 and Tables 4.2
and 4.3 summarize the results. Key observations of the experiments are:
Average classification accuracy (along with standard deviation), across cross validations trials, of whether the given iris image is normal or spoofed is shown in Table 4.2. The proposed DESIST framework yields average classification accuracy of
82.20%. This highlights the challenging nature of the problem that arises while
dealing with a medley of iris presentation attacks.
The parameters are tuned empirically for computing Zernike moments and learning the artificial neural network model. For calculation of Zernike moments, nonoverlapping patch sizes of 4 × 4, 8 × 8, and 16 × 16 are tested and patch size of 8 × 8
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yields the highest classification accuracy. For training the artificial neural network,
parameter testing is performed to compute the optimum number of hidden nodes (H).
By experimental analysis, 170 hidden nodes are chosen.
For comparison purposes, classification accuracies obtained by m-BSIF [45], wLBP
[35], and LUCID [12] are also reported in Table 4.2. The proposed DESIST framework yields the highest accuracy of 82.20% as compared to wLBP, m-BSIF, and
LUCID. Figure 4.2 shows the ROC curves for the top three performing algorithms:
proposed DESIST framework, LUCID, and m-BSIF. The Equal Error Rates (EERs)
are 17.86%, 20.68%, and 27.02% for proposed DESIST framework, LUCID, and mBSIF, respectively.
Further analysis is performed on the performance of the proposed framework. The
proposed DESIST framework correctly classifies 81.44% of normal iris images (true
Table 4.2: Average detection accuracy (%) for iris presentation attack detection using
different classification algorithms.
Classification Algorithm
wLBP [35]
m-BSIF [45]
LUCID [12]
Multi-Order Zernike Moments + ANN
LBPV + ANN
Proposed DESIST Framework

Mean Classification
Accuracy (Std Dev)(%)
59.85 (5.01)
63.86 (3.61)
73.21 (3.97)
76.22 (5.15)
78.45 (5.49)
82.20 (1.29)

Table 4.3: Average detection accuracy (%) for iris presentation attack detection on
different databases separately using proposed DESIST framework and LUCID [12].
Note that training is performed on the train set of CSD and for the test set, results
pertaining to individual spoof attacks are reported.
Database

Spoofing Type

Proposed
DESIST
Framework

LUCID [12]

IIIT-Delhi CLI
[23]

Contact Lens

54.34

54.88

98.67

95.16

98.10

84.95

Normal

98.57

97.41

Normal

88.55

84.96

IIITD IIS [24]
SDB [37]
IIT Delhi Iris
[71]
MID

Print+Scan,
Print+Capture
Synthetic Iris
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Figure 4.2: ROC curves showing the performance of top three anti-spoofing algorithms.
positive rate) whereas 82.92% of spoofed images are correctly labeled (true negative
rate). Figure 4.3 shows sample images from normal and spoofed classes which are
correctly and incorrectly classified by the proposed DESIST framework.
The proposed DESIST framework utilizes feature-level fusion of multi-order Zernike
moments and LBPV computed on the input iris image. For comparative analysis, the
performance of multi-order Zernike moments with ANN, and LBPV with ANN are
reported separately. On its own, multi-order Zernike moments with ANN yields an
accuracy of 76.22%, while LBPV with ANN yields an accuracy of 78.45%. These
results demonstrate that by applying feature-level fusion, there is an improvement in
the performance.
Table 4.3 shows the results obtained by analyzing the classification accuracy of
input iris images based on the type of presentation attack. Images from IIIT-Delhi
CLI database [23] show the lowest classification accuracy of 54.34%. It is observed
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Predicted Labels
Actual Labels

Normal

Spoofed

Normal

Spoofed

Figure 4.3: Sample iris images from normal and spoofed classes which are correctly
and incorrectly classified by the proposed DESIST framework.
that 44.36% of normal, 58.58% of transparent (soft), and 59.93% of textured (cosmetic
lens) are correctly detected. On IIITD IIS database [24], the proposed DESIST
framework correctly detects 98.67% images. In this database, 99.67% of print+scan
spoofed images and 97.60% of print+capture spoofed images are correctly classified
as spoofed. For SDB, IIT Delhi Iris, and MID databases correct classification accuracy
of 98.10%, 98.57%, and 88.55% is achieved by the DESIST framework.
In [23], the reported results show 64.14% accuracy on normal, 61.63% on transparent contact lens, and 94.74% on textured contact lens. Further, Gupta et al. [24]
have shown 100% classification accuracy in detecting print+scan attacks on IIITD
IIS database. it is worth mentioning that these reported results pertain to a single
spoofing attempt. However, in our case, the training model is learned from multiple
attacks and therefore, direct comparison of results is not feasible.
To compare the performance of the proposed DESIST framework with other approaches, database-wise performance of LUCID [12] is also reported in Table 4.3. It
is observed that similar to DESIST, LUCID shows lower accuracies on IIIT-D CLI
database. This highlights the challenging nature of the CSD database. For IIITD
IIS, SDB, IIT Delhi Iris, and MID, LUCID yields classification accuracy of 95.16%,
84.95%, 97.41%, and 84.96%, respectively.
Evaluation on LivDet-Iris 2013: The proposed DESIST framework is also

Naman Kohli

38

4.3. Iris PAD on iDCGAN Generated Iris Images

1

True Positive Rate

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

Synthetic Database [6]
Proposed iDCGAN Synthetic

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

False Positive Rate
Figure 4.4: Performance of presentation attack detection using DESIST on images
from the Synthetic DataBase [2] and the proposed iDCGAN synthetic images.
evaluated on Warsaw and Clarkson subsets of LivDet-Iris 2013 competition [72]. The
provided training and testing images are utilized for the comparison. Using the DESIST framework, total classification accuracy of 92.08% is observed on the Warsaw
subset and 79.59% on the Clarkson subset. The average classification accuracy for
the two databases combined is 87.03%. Using the proposed DESIST framework, the
true positive rate obtained is 97.19% and 70.73% for Warsaw and Clarkson subsets,
respectively. The proposed DESIST framework outperforms the participating algorithms in the competition by achieving the lowest average false positive rate of 11.56%
on the two datasets averaged. On the other hand, the achieved true negative rate is
87.11% and 84.55% for Warsaw and Clarkson subsets, respectively.

4.3

Iris PAD on iDCGAN Generated Iris Images

The key results of Chapter 3 illustrate that the synthetically generated iris images
from the proposed iDCGAN framework can be effectively deployed in iris presentation
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attacks. Hence, it is important to develop accurate iris presentation attack detection
(PAD) algorithms which can distinguish such synthetic iris images from real iris images. In this section, we showcase the results of DESIST [39] framework, which has
been shown to outperform other algorithms on the combined spoofing dataset, on
these iris images.

4.3.1 Experimental Protocol
In this experiment, we analyze the performance of DESIST PAD algorithm for detecting synthetically generated iris images. To showcase that the synthetically generated
iris images using the proposed iDCGAN framework are stronger adversary as compared to existing synthetic iris images, we utilize SDB [2]. SDB comprises 2,100
synthetic iris images. An equal number of real iris images and iris images that are
synthetically generated from the iDCGAN approach are utilized for experimental
evaluation. In this experiment, five-fold cross-validation is performed with unseen
training and testing samples. Multi-order Zernike moments and local binary pattern
with variance (LBPV) features are extracted to provide input to the DESIST framework for classifying iris images as real or synthetic using a neural network as the
classifier.

4.3.2 Results
The results of the presentation attack detection using DESIST are presented in Figure
4.4. Iris PAD accuracy on the synthetically generated iris images using the proposed
iDCGAN framework is 85.95% with equal error rate (EER) of 14.19%. PAD performance of DESIST on SDB is 92.17% with an EER of 7.09%. We observe that EER
by DESIST on SDB is approximately 2 times higher than the EER obtained with
iDCGAN generated images. As discussed in Chapter 3, the iris image quality scores
of the realistic appearing synthetically generated samples are closer to the real-world
samples and hence, it is difficult for the DESIST model to discriminate between the
samples of the real iris and presentation attack iris classes.

4.4

Summary

In the literature of iris presentation attack detection, researchers have typically focused on a particular type of iris spoofing attack and have presented solutions to
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address them. However, in real-world scenarios, iris recognition systems have to handle any type of presentation attack. In this chapter, we present a real-world scenario,
where a medley of spoofed iris images can be presented at the acquisition step. We
have utilized a combined database containing spoofed iris images belonging to contact lens, print-capture, print-scan, and synthetic iris images. We propose DESIST,
a framework to detect spoofed iris images across real-world attack scenarios. The
framework learns local structural changes by projecting the original image in the
Zernike moment space. Multi-order dense Zernike features are computed across the
input iris image. We also learn textural information through Local Binary Patterns
with Variance that accounts for contrast information. A feature level fusion of these
complementary features is presented and finally, a neural network classifier is trained
to detect spoofed iris images and normal images. The proposed DESIST framework
detects spoofed iris images with a classification accuracy of 82.20% when applied to
a combined iris spoofing database of normal and spoofed iris images and outperforms
other comparative algorithms. Additionally, we showcase the performance of DESIST on the synthetic iris images generated by iDCGAN framework and observe that
these synthetic images are difficult to detect as compared to the previously generated
synthetic iris images.

Chapter

Conclusion and Future Work
5.1

Conclusion and Future Work

Similar to other biometric modalities, iris recognition systems are also vulnerable
to presentation attacks (commonly known as spoofing) that attempt to conceal or
impersonate identity. Examples of typical iris presentation attacks are printed iris
images, textured contact lenses, and synthetic creation of iris images. In the era
of improving deep learning algorithms, we present a novel iDCGAN framework to
generate synthetic iris images. The framework utilizes generative adversarial networks
alongside iris quality measures to synthesize realistic iris images. The generated
images are compared and shown to have similar or better iris quality measures as
compared to real iris images that were used to train the framework. Finally, we
showcase the efficacy of these images as presentation attacks and observe that these
images end up being enrolled by a commercial iris recognition software. In this
thesis, we also focus on detecting a medley of iris presentation attacks and present
a unified framework for detecting such attacks. We propose a novel structural and
textural feature based iris spoofing detection framework (DESIST). Multi-order dense
Zernike moments are calculated across the iris image which encode variations in the
structure of the iris image. Local Binary Pattern with Variance (LBPV) is utilized
for representing textural changes in a spoofed iris image. The highest classification
accuracy of 82.20% is observed by the proposed framework for detecting presentation
attack on a combined iris spoofing database. We also showcase the performance
of this framework on the iDCGAN generated images and observe that current iris
presentation detection algorithms need to be improved to detect such attacks.
The increasing interest in iris recognition, particularly in mobile devices, has made
41
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it highly vulnerable to presentation attacks and has renewed interest in developing sophisticated presentation attack detection algorithms. Generative algorithms continue
to improve with new generative adversarial algorithms coming up such as BEGAN [6],
BIG-GAN [73], and other generative algorithms such as Wasserstein Autoencoders
[74]. These algorithms can be utilized in conjunction with iris quality measures to
generate realistic iris images at a higher resolution. Novel deep learning based presentation attack detection algorithms should be trained for better performance. One
of the issues currently why such algorithms are difficult to train, is lack of large-scale
iris presentation attack databases. Thus, the creation of such databases is another
area that researchers should focus on.
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